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ABSTRACT
Lately, the study of human rights has become a dangerous ground for 
historians—above all in Europe. In his celebrated Le Sottisier, Gustave 
Flaubert ironically defined history as a dangerous knowledge for teachers 
and students; yet, he was not fully aware in his time of all the rivalries and 
pretentions that scholars from other fields—like anthropology, law, sociology, 
political theory—would raise. In fact, those scholars seem to be frightened 
when seeing the ranks of the historians approaching a field they consider 
their own property. This is certainly the case of human rights. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Lately, the study of human rights has become a dangerous ground for 
historians. There are multiple reasons behind this found inside as well as 
outside of history. Internal reasons may be identified in the old, and yet 
unsolved, opposition between the historians focusing on cultural relativism 
and historicism, on the one side, and those focusing on the cosmopolitan 
and universalistic dimension of rights, on the other. However, the external 
reasons can be deemed more important.
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In his celebrated Le Sottisier, Gustave Flaubert ironically defined his-
tory as a dangerous knowledge for teachers and students;1 yet, he was not 
fully aware in his time of all the rivalries and pretentions that scholars from 
other fields like anthropology, law, sociology, and political theory, would 
raise. In fact, those scholars seem to be frightened when seeing the ranks 
of the historians approaching a field they consider as their own property. 
This is certainly the case of human rights. Indeed, historical inquiry on this 
topic started very late. Not that many results have been reached until now, 
but there are enough to raise alarmed reactions due to the political impact 
and cultural consequences they could produce in the contemporary debates 
within the public sphere. 
II. THE DELAY OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND NEW HISTORIES ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
In his article “The Recent History of Human Rights,” Kenneth Cmiel em-
phasized the fact that only in 1997 did the American Historical Association 
choose human rights as the subject of its yearly Convention.2 Therefore, he 
asserted that even if “[f]ew political agendas have seen such a rapid and 
dramatic growth as that of ‘human rights[,]’ [p]rior to the 1940s the term 
was rarely used.”3 
With sharp irony, arguing against those who were turning even Bud-
dha and Jesus into “human rights activists,” Cmiel denounced the danger 
of anachronism and historiographical mistakes run by those who confused 
the eighteenth century term “rights of man” with “human rights” in order 
to be politically correct in the contemporary world, but leaving too much 
room for the rhetoric of human rights.4 Historical research, its methods, 
and its rules, had to be respected and defended from those who believed 
only in the eternal present, in the ideological removal of the past, or from 
those building new political utopias in spite of their embarrassing historical 
roots—such as the Reign of Terror.
According to Cmiel, in order to meet the task of an accurate historical 
reconstruction of the genealogy of human rights, historians have to start 
from the origins of the human rights language, a ground concealing specific 
geographical and cultural areas, personalities, concepts, points of view, and 
significant events.5 In other words, historians, bound by their methodologies, 
  1. See Gustave Flaubert, le Dictionnaire Des iDées reçues De Flaubert (Anne Herschberg-Pierrot 
ed., 1988).
  2. Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 am. Hist. rev. 117, 119 (2004).
  3. Id. at 117.
  4. Id. at 119.
  5. Id. at 120.
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must find their starting points in linguistic landmarks such as the United States 
Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French Déclaration des droits 
de l’homme of 1789. These sources refer only to the “rights of man,”6 which 
must be considered as something different from natural rights as they were 
sketched in the canon law of the Middle Ages, from the modern rights of men 
and women envisaged by some Enlightened thinkers of the late eighteenth 
century, as well as from the rights of person of the new Thomistic tradition 
(as they can be found in Emmanuel Mounier7 and Jacques Maritain8), and 
from the human rights that have developed after the Second World War. 
In this direction, with respect to the truth of historical semantics, those 
latter topics have been inquired by some fundamental research.9 Similarities 
and dissimilarities among different stages of the history of human rights, and 
particularly between the eighteenth century culture of “rights of man” and 
the contemporary culture fueling the present debate on human rights, have 
been clarified by Samuel Moyn.10 Moyn’s deeply interesting work, which 
speaks not only to historians but to everyone dealing with human rights, 
vigorously supports the thesis of a sharp discontinuity between those two 
cultural worlds. Nevertheless, Moyn’s stance lacks a full historical interpreta-
tion of the Enlightenment Rights Talk, mainly because of a widespread delay 
of the international historiography on human rights in the Enlightenment.
Moyn considers the human rights movement for as an absolute outcome 
of the present world, picturing it as the last utopia invented by humankind, 
something unprecedented, and wholly different from what has been created 
in the past.11 He properly argues that the expression “human rights” did not 
become current until before the second half of the 1970s.12 
Indeed, that expression has been spread under the influence of John Rawls 
and Ronald Dworkin,13 then was used in the United States administration’s 
official documents, both under left-leaning with progressive tones (i.e. Jimmy 
Carter)14 and right-leaning with conservative tones (i.e. Ronald Reagan).15 But, 
  6. Id. at 122.
  7. See emmanuel mounier, maniFeste au service Du Personnalisme (1936), available at http://clas-
siques.uqac.ca/classiques/Mounier_Emmanuel/manifeste_service_pers/mounier_mani-
feste_pers.pdf.  
  8. See Jacques maritain, saint tHomas anD tHe Problem oF evil (1942).
  9. See ricHarD tuck, natural riGHts tHeories: tHeir oriGin anD DeveloPment (1982); brian tier-
ney, tHe iDea oF natural riGHts: stuDies on natural riGHts, natural law, anD cHurcH law 
1150–1625 (1997); knuD Haakonssen, natural law anD moral PHilosoPHy: From Grotius 
to tHe scottisH enliGHtenment (1996); t.J. HocHstrasser, natural law tHeories in tHe early 
enliGHtenment (2000); lynn Hunt, inventinG Human riGHts: a History (2007); Dan Edelstein, 
Enlightenment Rights Talk, 86 J. moD. Hist. 530 (2014).
 10. See samuel moyn, tHe last utoPia: Human riGHts in History (2010).
 11. Id. at 2.
 12. Id.
 13. See JoHn rawls, a tHeory oF Justice (1971); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in 
aPPlieD etHics: a multicultural aPProacH 26 (Larry May & Shari Collins Sharratt eds., 1994).
 14. Moyn, supra note 10, at 216.
 15. Id. at 217.
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above all, onward from the second half of the 1970s, important international 
movements for human rights were born, such as the Human Rights Watch, or 
were granted exceptional acknowledgments, as with the Nobel prize given to 
Amnesty International in 1977. In Moyn’s opinion, the new utopia of human 
rights did not arise in the wake of the debate about the Holocaust or of the 
UN Declaration of 1948, as historiography would suggest, but rather as an 
answer to the evident and progressive end of old utopias, such as Socialist 
International and the capitalistic democratic reform movement.16 Hence, the 
innovative utopia of those movements for a new morality of humankind, 
with their anti-political and universalistic vocation, clashed with the state 
and the nation; statism and nationalism, in the previous centuries, had been 
guilty of neocolonialism and the imperialist modern forms.
Until now, “human rights” was considered to be a modern and more 
politically correct version of the “rights of man” expression, or droits de 
l’homme, used in the Enlightenment and by the 1789 revolutionaries.17 But 
this historical and linguistic distinction between “human rights” and “rights 
of man” is not completely harmless, and it risks generating problems when 
used without critical awareness. Indeed, this distinction is creating misun-
derstandings and confusion in Europe, not only in the field of historical 
research, where scholars are sometimes accused without foundation, of 
sexism by the supporters of an ideologized version of political correctness 
for refusing linguistic anachronisms. Also in the wider domain of political 
and juridical discourse: European institutions wanting to respect the reasons 
of their centuries-old history—that is to conserve expressions of the past in 
important international institutions with the reference to the “rights of man” 
in their own names—are requested to bend to this new linguistic trend.18 
See for instance, the case of the European Court of the Rights of Man, 
systematically translated in English as European Court of Human Rights.19 
 16. Id. at 7–8.
 17. See tHe FrencH revolution anD Human riGHts: a brieF Documentary History (Lynn Hunt ed., 
1996).
 18. moyn, supra note 10, at 217.
 19. In France, the historical and linguistic problems have been recently pointed out with 
the campaign of a feminist group aimed to convince the Parliament and President 
François Hollande, to change the name of the Declaration des Droits de l’homme (see 
Kim Willsher, French Feminists Demand Rewording of 1789 “Rights of Man” Declara-
tion, GuarDian, 21 May 2015, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
may/21/french-feminists-rights-of-man-declaration-petition.) In Italy, one of the most 
important Italian historians has debated the question on the most important Italian 
newspaper (Giuseppe Galasso, Because of the Intellectual Trends, Europe Gives its 
Historical Role up: World History and Human Sciences Diminish a Centuries-Old 
Heritage, corriere Della sera, 9 June 2015). Therefore, the risks of a lack of historical 
and critical awareness about the difference between “human rights” and “rights of 
man” is really becoming a crucial question for international law as well. See Jean-Luc 
Egger, “Diritti dell’uomo” e “Diritti umani:” Sinominia Pacifica?, 3 leGes 503 (2014). 
Vol. 39134 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
A turning, as much as arguable, point in Moyn’s discontinuous histori-
cal reconstruction is represented by the theory of the utopian and moral 
perspective of the human rights movement—indeed, the last chapter of his 
book is titled “Burden of Morality.”20 Hence, human rights seem to have 
anti-political features, and their foundation is a “politics of suffering” boost-
ing their action.21 These innovative features are pictured as different from the 
Enlightenment cultural and political project of the “rights of man” as stated 
in the 1789 Declaration, and are considered a “politics of citizenship,”22 a 
reform plan to reach the rights of citizenship through the state and the na-
tion—two essential elements of the Western political modernity.
This last point seems to be questionable. Recent international historical 
research on the language of the “rights of man” founded by the eighteenth 
century Enlightenment discloses new details and reinterpretations worthy 
of being known and spread among all those human rights scholars—even 
from different perspectives and points of view.23 
Moyn seems to overlook the need to distinguish the Enlightenment from 
the French Revolution; this need springs from a theory that considers the 
Enlightenment as a laboratory of modernity.24 The heart of that laboratory 
lies not only in its use of critical reason but in the idea of man in himself, 
searching for his own humanity through a political reform project of eman-
cipation founded on the sciences of man. In this perspective, Enlightenment 
can be seen as a new original humanism, one that gained hegemony among 
European elites in the form Late Enlightenment—Tardo Illuminismo, Lumières 
tardives, Spätaufklärung—at the end of the eighteenth century. This culture 
had very different features from the revolutionary culture of 1789.25 
Moyn thus seems to overlook the double fascinating character—a 
utopian and moral, as well as a realistic character, in the political and 
juridical fields—of the Enlightenment project of the Rights of Man, which 
invented the individual subject, defending him from the despotic power of 
the absolute state and the class privileges of the Old Regime—enemies that 
were renewed in the principle of nationality in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This project also deeply distinguished itself from the ideas and 
deeds of the revolutionary elites and the leaders of the Terror, as testified by 
Nicolas de Condorcet’s tragic experience, by his death in a Jacobin prison, 
 20. Moyn, supra note 10, at 212.
 21. See id.
 22. Id. at 12.
 23. About this, the reference is to the results of Vincenzo Ferrone’s research from 2003. See 
vincenzo Ferrone, tHe Politcs oF enliGHtenment: rePublicanism, constitutionalism, anD tHe riGHts 
oF man in Gaetano FilanGieri (Sophus A. Reinert trans., 2012); vincenzo Ferrone, storia Dei 
Diritti Dell’uomo: l’illuminismo e la costruzione Del linGuaGGio Politico Dei moDerni (2014).
 24. moyn, supra note 10.
 25. See vincenzo Ferrone, tHe enliGHtenment: History oF an iDea (Elisabetta Tarantino trans., 
2015).
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and by the renowned pages of his Esquisse d’un Tableau Historique des 
Progrès de L’esprit Humain.26
The Esquisse was the spiritual legacy of a whole century of reflections, 
as well as the real final manifesto of the European Enlightenment’s political 
and social thought on rights. Reading its lines it can be understood that 
Condorcet considered the “rights of man” as defined by the simultaneous 
presence of the following qualities and characteristics: 1) they naturally 
pertain to human beings as such; 2) they must be the same for all the indi-
viduals, without any kind of distinction concerning birth, class, nationality, 
religion, gender, or skin color; 3) they have to be universal; and, 4) they 
have to be considered unalienable and imprescriptibly in front of any politi-
cal and religious institution.27 With this in mind, Condorcet advocated in a 
hard struggle against slavery, and for the rights of women and of religious 
minorities, before and during the Revolution.28
From a theoretical point of view, Condorcet developed a modern, secu-
larized Enlightened philosophy of history, in order to explain the progressive 
emergence of the “rights of man” from the oblivion through the secular 
struggles for liberty as a sign and evidence of the civil progress of human-
ity.29 He was one of the first thinkers who turned Thomas More’s traditional 
utopian genre into something that had never been thought of before: ucronia; 
that is a social and political dream imagined not in an unreal place, but 
rather in an unreal time, in a future dream to be fulfilled.30 He described in 
the following way the last era of humanity—the era of the final triumph of 
the Enlightenment Rights throughout the world:
Il arrivera donc, ce moment où le soleil n’éclairera plus, sur la terre, que des 
hommes libres, et ne reconnaissant d’autre maître que leur raison; où les tyrans 
et les esclaves, les prêtres et leurs stupides ou hypocrites instruments n’existeront 
plus que dans l’histoire et sur les théâtres.31
In Esquisse, Condorcet had discovered those rights one after the other, 
one century after the other, as innate rights in the struggles for the liberation 
and progress of the human spirit.32 He had understood that their declara-
tion was not enough: they had to be claimed, practiced, warranted in their 
“exercise,” turned into droits politiques—i.e. into a written Constitution.33 
Together with Thomas Paine, Gaetano Filangieri, and Francesco Mario Pa-
 26. See marie Jean antoine nicolas caritat De conDorcet, esquisse D’un Tableau Historique Des 
ProGrès De L’esPrit Humain (1988).
 27. Id.
 28. See id.
 29. See id.
 30. See bronislaw baczko, lumières De l’utoPie 202 (1978).
 31. See conDorcet, supra note 26, at 271.
 32. See id.
 33. See id.
Vol. 39136 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY
gano (with his Project of Constitution for the Neapolitan Republic of 1799), 
Condorcet was one of the fathers of Enlightenment Constitutionalism, a 
historiographical category not deeply known yet, and often mistaken with 
the Revolutionaries’ Constitutionalism. The Enlightenment Constitutionalism 
was truly original as compared to the customary Constitutionalism of the 
Old Regime—opposing power to power and intermediate bodies to the king, 
according to Montesquieu’s Machiavellian view34—and to the Revolutionary 
Constitutionalism, ruled by General Will, the primacy of legislative power, 
and the principle of national sovereignty. The heart of Enlightenment Con-
stitutionalism was held instead by the “rights of man,” written in a solemn 
introductory declaration, and the building of an innovative judicial system 
for realizing them—as Filangieri’s monumental Scienza Della Legislazione 
hoped for35 or for defending them from the legislative power’s limitless sov-
ereignty. This latter was the fear of Pagano; indeed, he envisaged an original 
instrument to protect them, the Magistratura degli Efori, very similar to the 
actual Supreme Courts.36
In the last ten years, the history of human rights has been rebuilt above 
all in the United States and in Italy, but starting from different research 
theories, sensitivities, and historiographical methods. Thus, the results are 
very different. But those results can enrich the international debate on the 
authentic nature, the present, and the possible future of human rights. 
Lynn Hunt and Dan Edelstein have reconstructed the history of the “rights 
of man” mainly on the basis of a historiographical hypothesis focusing on 
the emotional change that occurred in common sensitivity and in the Euro-
pean eighteenth century mind, due to the clamorous success of the novels 
of Samuel Richardson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These novels changed 
the way European elites thought about human relationships, promoting 
the bienveillance—the modern empathy towards “the other” in respect to 
“oneself.” Inspired by Franco Venturi, the Turin School has deployed another 
kind of approach, focused instead on: the Enlightenment’s direct and fun-
damental contribution in shaping the modern language of rights the great 
political awareness of a movement whose effort was towards new reforms, 
a new subversive and utopian culture against the Old Regime stances, and, 
finally, on reformist politics engineered to protect people from themselves 
and from power, emancipating them, and making them happy by way of 
the influence of public opinion with its media.37
 34. See id.
 35. See Gaetano FilanGieri, la scienza Della leGislazione (2003); see also vincenzo Ferrone, La 
societa’ Giusta eD equa: rePubblicanesimo e Diritti Dell’uomo in Gaetano FilanGieri (2003).
 36. On the “Enlightenment Constitutionalism,” see Ferrone, tHe Politics oF enliGHtenment, supra 
note 23, at 140.
 37. See Ferrone, Storia dei Diritti dell’uoMo, supra note 23; see also diritti e CoStituzione: 
l’opera di Gaetano FilanGieri e la Sua Fortuna (Antonio Trampus ed. 2005).
2017 The Rights of History: Enlightenment and Human Rights 137
There are those same differences even with reference to Jonathan Israel’s 
more recent thesis, albeit still unproven, about the relationship between the 
“Radical Enlightenment” and the “rights of man.” In fact, Israel does not 
devote much room to this relationship, as if it were taken for granted. These 
rights, properly considered as corner-stones of modernity,38 are defined by 
him as “inextricably linked to radical monist philosophical positions during 
the Enlightenment era.”39 Actually, things went quite differently. It was the 
exponents of deism, natural religion, and more generally, of the moderate 
Enlightenment—John Locke, Jean Barbeyrac, Giambattista Vico, Antonio 
Genovesi, Cesare Beccaria, Voltaire, Condorcet, Rousseau—who led the 
struggle for rights, beginning with the struggle for the libertas philosophandi 
and religious liberty as a “natural right.”
The idea of natural rights has all but a philosophical foundation: it is 
an extraordinary moral idea, an ethical postulate based above all on the 
acknowledgement of the “dignity of the person” according to a model that 
can be found in Cicero, Pico della Mirandola, and Voltaire. During the 
eighteenth century, this idea was turned into an innovative and powerful 
political and juridical language, through its concrete use in the struggle for 
reforms and for the defense, the emancipation, and the freedom of the indi-
vidual. The main actors in this process were Locke, Barbeyrac, Jean-Jacques 
Burlamaqui, Rousseau, Genovesi, Beccaria, and Filangieri.
If one really looks for the intellectual roots of natural rights, one should 
probably not turn towards philosophy or towards Spinozian monism. They 
must be looked for in the building of a new science of Man and in the 
Enlightenment’s ambitious project to renew humanism focusing on the 
individual—as we can read in the Encyclopédie.40 Indeed, how could one 
think about the invention of the “rights of man” without previously inventing 
a new idea of Man, redefining the relationships between the individual and 
the community, his liberty and his responsibility? The validity of the civil 
value of those rights, and their possible capability to gain a political reform 
of the Old Regime basis, must be identified in human history, as Vico and 
Condorcet did, and certainly not in any philosophical speculation.
This is the perspective in which historical scholarship—when dealing 
with the circulation of the idea of “rights of man” in the different European 
historical contexts in which it was born, in which it was given a moral and 
political meaning, and deeply differing from Medieval Canon Law’s con-
ception of Subjective Right and Natural Rights—has achieved some results 
deeply enriching the debate on human rights.
 38. Jonathan iSrael, deMoCratiC enliGhtenMent: philoSophy, revolution, and huMan riGhtS 1750–
1790, at 13 (2011).
 39. Id. at 21.
 40. See Denis DiDerot & Jean le rorD D’alembert, l’encycloPéDie (Patrick Baradeau & Yves Ver-
beek eds., 1985).
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In the Italian context, such research outcomes have led to the reconstruc-
tion from the point of view of the history of ideas, of the special theoretical 
contribution, to an original constitutional and republican reading of the 
“rights of man” that was given by Vico and Genovesi, and then by Beccaria 
and Filangieri in the political and juridical areas. In this sense, in Filangieri’s 
Scienza della Legislazione, the real masterpiece and bestseller of the Late 
Enlightenment, translated in the more important languages of the West—the 
rights of man and the principle of their equality acted as the basis for a 
modern judicial system embracing every sphere of civil life: from a rights-
oriented state-building conception to public education, from the reform of 
criminal law to a legislation in religious and economic matters based on the 
protection of the dignity of man and his fundamental rights.
For the first time, in the volume of the Scienza della Legislazione dedi-
cated to economy and the laws of political economy, Filangieri put rights 
before the autonomy of the market.41 This latter, oppositely, has prevailed 
in the reflections on the rights developed by the Anglo-Saxon Enlighten-
ment, particularly by Hume and Smith, who politically neutralized them, 
relegating them to the mere juridical field because of their dangerousness 
in politics and economy.42
On the other hand, in Northern Europe and among Parisian physiocrats, 
there prevailed an interpretation of the “rights of man” considered as derived 
from duties (duty-based), in the wake of the stoic principle of sociability pro-
moted by Samuel von Pufendorf in his small “catechism” of natural rights.43 
Since the early decades of the eighteenth century enlightened thinkers 
from Naples, Milan, and Paris, polemicized with this conception of natural 
right descending from Hugo Grotius and Pufendorf, deeming it to be affected 
by Thomist rationalism and too compromised with absolutism and divine 
right monarchies. Their goal was to historically reassess the individual’s 
freedom in his relation with the community, in the republican participation 
to politics, as well as in his pursuit of happiness as natural right.
It was mainly in France, with Rousseau, Voltaire, Denis Diderot, and 
Louis-Sébastien Mercier, that the language of rights turned into a true “po-
litical formula,” a powerful tool in the struggle against the Old Regime, 
thanks to its appeal to public opinion through every communication media. 
The consequence was the “modern politicization” of Late Enlightenment 
literature, represented by Diderot’s aesthetic revolution that appealed both 
to passions and reason, framing each form of art in the function of the 
emancipation of the individual, against slavery, inequalities, and the class 
justice of the Old Regime.
 41. See FilanGieri, supra note 35.
 42. For the results here shortly pointed out, see Ferrone, storia Dei Diritti Dell’uomo, supra 
note 23.
 43. samuel von PuFenDorF, De oFFicio Hominis et civis Juxta leGem naturalem (1682).
2017 The Rights of History: Enlightenment and Human Rights 139
In the heart of Europe and in the territories of the Holy Roman Em-
pire, the influence of the Italian, French, and US Enlightenment has been 
much stronger than what it was thought until now. It suffices to mention, 
for examples, the success of Beccaria’s denouncement of torture and the 
death penalty and calling for a reform of criminal law, Diderot’s writings 
against slavery, Voltaire’s polemics in the affaire Calas, or the Declaration 
of Independence of 1776. A decisive battle for the history of the “rights of 
man” in the West was fought in Germany’s most eminent universities, in the 
newspapers of Berlin and Munich, and in the salons and princely courts.
Although already known at the beginning of the eighteenth century in 
the duty-based version of Pufendorf—reintroduced by Christian Wolff and 
followed by the Scottish thinkers— the topic of rights was used and promoted 
in the second half of the century to challenge the absolutistic conception of 
the modern state that had drifted into Frederick II’s despotism.
The process was interrupted following the events of the order of the 
Illuminati of Bavaria and the persecutions of young Aufklärer like Johann 
Gottfried Herder, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, and Friedrich Schiller were 
involved in the case, as well as with the failure of the propaganda of rights 
attempted by Adam Weishaupt by means of political conspiracy and sectar-
ian freemasonry. The proclamation of the Prussian General Code in 1794 
marked the final neutralization of rights.
By turning the entire eighteenth century debate on rights in the Holy 
Roman Empire in rigid juridical formulas, the Prussian General Code ended 
the brilliant age of cosmopolitanism and Enlightenment in Germany. It reaf-
firmed centuries-old choices of political culture inspired by Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan; choices based on the idea that only the state, in its modern, bu-
reaucratized and legislatively-almighty version, had the capacity to generate 
and protect the civil society, granting rights from above to its subjects, as 
opposed to what had been argued by Locke and the Late Enlightenment 
republicans about the primacy of civil society and the rights on the state.
With the French Revolution and The Terror, the Enlightenment project 
of protecting the individual, emancipating him, and giving him happiness 
through the practice of rights came to an abrupt and bloody end. It was at-
tacked, then forgotten, and finally entered into a historiographical shadow 
that persisted until our time.
European history undoubtedly took another direction, which is yet to 
reconstruct from the viewpoint of the possible legacy of the world and the 
language of rights shaped by the Enlightenment as a shelter from the new 
colonialism, the omnipotence of the state, and, above all, racist nationalism. 
The task of reconstructing those terrible events and their generative relations 
with the twentieth century’s totalitarianisms will be a challenge for future 
historians working on the new historiography on the Enlightenment and its 
legacy in Western history.
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However, the turning question from which all Anglo-Saxon recent his-
toriography on human rights has started still remains: what are the reasons 
that drove the 1776 Declaration of Independence to define as self-evident 
the truths relevant to human rights?44 First, it must be noted that Declara-
tion’s language was completely in line with Pufendorf and Grotius’ doctrine 
of natural rights, based on demonstrative logics and the Euclidean geometry 
of self-evident postulates. Apart from this, the answer provided by Hunt, 
which centered around the emotional change in collective sensibility of the 
eighteenth century,45 can be accepted only partially in front of the reconstruc-
tion I have tried to express, pointing to the powerful and conscious political 
campaign on the “rights of man” organized by European Enlightened elites. 
The consciousness and intentionality of that campaign opens the door to 
new questions. 
III. CONCLUSION
Why did those Enlightened circles commit themselves so firmly in this struggle 
to create a new political language to defend and emancipate the man? More 
generally, why did the Enlightened West discover the “rights of man”?
A possible answer could come from a faraway past and from a deep 
crisis that kept in check Western civilization in itself. The reference is to 
the harsh civil and religious war that has been fought for almost two cen-
turies, from the sixteenth to the early eighteenth centuries, afflicting the 
whole continent with its horrors and slaughters, and that lies at the heart of 
this answer. The pitiless massacres between Protestants and Catholics not 
only broke up forever Christianity and its unitary idea of truth, generating 
longstanding hate and feeding the skeptical movement, but also put into 
crisis the ancient conception according to which no human community nor 
civilization is possible without religion. As Fyodor Dostoevsky asked himself 
with anguish, “is everything permitted without God?”46; Friedrich Nietzsche 
wrote, “To my eyes no idea is greater than the denial of God. What is the 
history of mankind? The man has done nothing other than inventing God 
to avoid reciprocal killing.”47 The civil and religious war of those centuries 
showed how that invention was failing everywhere. Instead of restraining and 
limiting the will of power and the homicide spirit of man, God had become 
the justification for the killing of Christians. This was bitterly admitted by 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and the fathers of modern natural law, determined to give 
 44. See selF-eviDent trutHs? Human riGHts anD tHe enliGHtenment (Kate E. Tunstall ed., 2012).
 45. See Hunt, supra note 9.
 46. FyoDor Dostoyevsky, i Fratelli karamazov [tHe brotHers karamazov] 88 (2004).
 47. FrieDricH nietzscHe, la volontà Di Potenza [Der wille zur macHt] 129 (1984). 
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new ground to the principle of authority and to create a new moral science 
of man’s duties, a secularized one, autonomous from religions mastered by 
priests and theologians and pitting each one against the other. That admis-
sion paved the way to deism and the revolutionary conception of natural 
religion, towards the discovery of the moral idea of the “rights of man” 
as the new possible stop and limit to the will of power and the homicide 
instinct of the homo necans. It all started with Hobbes claiming the natural 
right to life, then Barbeyrac claiming it for religious freedom, finally ending 
with Burlamaqui and his idea of a natural right to the pursuit of happiness, 
leaning on human works instead of the design of Divine Providence. In 
other words, the Enlightenment, with its political language of rights, arose 
from the moral failure of a burning Christianity that threatened the existence 
itself of the individual.
The real objectives of the Enlightened intellectuals became the creation 
of new morals, rational and universal, and founded upon rights on the one 
side, and on the other side, the education of mankind by overcoming the 
ancient connection between morals and religion as the founding principle of 
civil coexistence—the connection that had allowed Plato, in the celebrated 
Book 10 of his last work, The Laws, to attack the partisans of atheism. From 
this viewpoint it was not Pierre Bayle’s hypothesis about the possible existence 
of a society of atheists, nor the theses of the Radical Enlightenment material-
ists that laid the premises for a universalistic and cosmopolitan conception 
of rights. It was instead the deists like Voltaire, Filangieri, or Rousseau, that 
promoted a natural religion common to each peoples, without churches 
or theologians, envisaged to improve the existence of the individuals and 
inclined to think of a faraway God, not involved in human events. It was 
the time of the first inquiries of the Enlightenment on religion as a natural 
experience, expression of the human need to ease existential anguishes, up 
to Rousseau’s civil religion of the “rights of man.”
Starting from those extraordinary ideas, the history of mankind, through 
defeats and delusions, created upon time the foundations for what we now 
call Human Rights Talk.
